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 "CONSTRUCTING" NATIONS WITHIN STATES:
 THE QUEST FOR FEDERAL RECOGNITION
 BY THE CATAWBA AND LUMBEE TRIBES
 BY ANNE MERLINE MCCULLOCH AND DAVID E. WILKINS
 Creating and in some cases re-creating viable tribal political commu-
 nities within the construct of the modern nation-state has proven to be a
 troublesome task for indigenous populations worldwide. The task for
 indigenous governments in the United States has been further complicated
 by federalism's divisions of power between the states and the national
 government. Native American tribes often find themselves waging a two-
 front battle in which they must resist state encroachments over their lands
 and their inherent governing authority; while at the same time they must
 lobby the federal government for protection of those same lands and powers.
 History is replete with attempts by the federal government to forcibly
 remove tribes from their ancestral and treaty-recognized homelands,' to
 facilitate assimilation using acts of cultural genocide,2 and to sever the federal
 trust relationship with tribes. These often well-intentioned, but highly
 destructive policies have taken their toll on tribes' political status, economic
 resources, and cultural integrity. This is particularly true for many Eastern
 tribes, especially those in the mid-Atlantic region, that generally were not
 accorded federal recognition in the form of treaties and thus did not benefit
 from the accompanying "protection" of the federal trust relationship.4 In
 addition, many Eastern tribes never had reservations set aside for them, a
 major source of geographic security that many Western tribes have enjoyed.
 Federal recognition is the primary method used by tribes to affirm
 their existence as distinct political communities within the American system.
 Federal recognition buffers tribal existence from most jurisdictional en-
 croachments by state and local governments and, ideally, should shield the
 tribes from federal encroachments as well. It also provides tribes and their
 members with certain political, legal, and economic benefits. Tribes have been
 marginalized and have experienced great difficulty sustaining themselves as
 viable political and cultural entities without federal recognition.
 This paper will analyze the campaigns for federal recognition of the
 Catawba Indian Tribe of South Carolina and the Lumbee Indian Tribe of
 North Carolina. The Catawba were successful in their battle to re-establish a
 federal relationship when Congress passed legislation in 1993 finalizing the
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 settlement between the Catawba tribe and South Carolina. The settlement
 transferred responsibility for the tribe and its reservation from South
 Carolina to the federal government and also settled a treaty land claim that
 had been outstanding since 1840. The Lumbee Tribe, on the other hand, has
 been unsuccessful in its quest for complete federal recognition despite efforts
 dating to the 1880s.
 Our analysis of these campaigns for federal recognition is based on
 the thesis that federal recognition is dependent on the tribes' externally and
 internally constructed social identities. The model we have chosen in
 analyzing this thesis is the policy formulation model recently proposed by
 Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram.5 This model uses the socially constructed
 identity of a target group or population to analyze and predict the types of
 federal policies that will be directed toward that group. Schneider and Ingram
 argue that the "dynamic interaction of power and social constructions leads
 to a distinctive pattern in the allocation of benefits and burdens to the
 different types of target groups."6' Those groups with positive social construc-
 tions and with strong levels of power, as defined by the ability to mobilize
 resources for action, will be overcompensated and are termed "advantaged
 groups." "Contenders" are those groups that are negatively constructed but
 have sufficient power to affect policymakers. In the case of the latter group,
 public officials "will prefer policy that grants benefits noticed only by
 members of the target groups and largely hidden from everyone else."7'
 "Dependent groups" are positively constructed but lack sufficient power to
 direct political benefits. Finally, "deviants" are both negatively constructed
 and are lacking in power, making them susceptible to policy constraints or
 even punishments. It is our argument that Native American tribes con-
 structed by the "Anglo" community as "advantaged" or "dependent," i.e., as
 having a positive image, will have a greater probability of becoming federally
 recognized than those constructed as "contenders" or "deviant."
 By examining two Southeastern tribes, each with extensive historical
 relations with the United States, we hope to illuminate the factors inherent
 in the construction of the tribes' social identity and to determine which
 factors seem most critical to federal recognition. Analysis of these factors may
 benefit the more than one hundred other tribal groups that are petitioning
 the federal government for the establishment of diplomatic relations.
 FEDERAL RECOGNITION:
 Federal recognition historically has had two distinctive meanings.
 Before the 1870s, "recognize" or "recognition" was used in the cognitive
 sense. In other words, federal officials simply acknowledged that a tribe
 existed." During the 1880s, however, "recognition" or, more accurately,
 "acknowledgment," began to be used in a formal jurisdictional sense. Today
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 the federal government's acknowledgment is a formal act that establishes a
 political relationship between a tribe and the United States. Federal acknowl-
 edgment affirms a tribe's sovereign status. Simultaneously, it outlines the
 federal government's responsibilities to the tribe.
 Federal acknowledgment means that a tribe is not only entitled to the
 immunities and privileges available to other tribes, but is also subject to the
 same federal powers, limitations, and other obligations of recognized tribes.
 What this means, particularly the "limitations" term, is that "acknowledg-
 ment shall subject the Indian tribe to the same authority of Congress and the
 United States to which other federal acknowledged tribes are subjected."' In
 short, tribes are informed that they are now subject to federal, particularly
 congressional, plenary power. The doctrine of "plenary power" is one of the
 central, yet most problematic, concepts in federal Indian policy and law.'o
 Since Indian nations were not and have not been included in the constitu-
 tional structure of the United States, the doctrine of federal "plenary power"
 has been derived through Supreme Court interpretation of the Indian
 Commerce Clause to give to the United States Congress the right to exercise
 all but unbridled power over tribal governments, lands, and resources.
 Because the power is not within the construct of the Constitution, it is not
 limited by it. Constitutional protections (federalism, equal protection, Bill of
 Rights) against governmental intrusion into the lives of people do not apply
 to Indian governments."
 Although Congress traditionally has had recognition authority, in
 1978 the Bureau of Indian Affairs developed an administrative process which
 unacknowledged tribes were to follow when seeking recognition. This set of
 guidelines was based mainly on confirmation by individuals and groups
 outside the tribe that members of the group were Indians. The mandatory
 criteria were as follows: the identification of the petitioners "from historical
 times until the present on a substantially continuous basis, as 'American
 Indian' or 'Aboriginal' "'2 by the federal government, state or local govern-
 ments, scholars, or other Indian tribes; the habitation of the tribe on land
 identified as Indian; a functioning government that had authority over its
 members; a constitution; a roll of members based on criteria acceptable to the
 Secretary of the Interior; not being a terminated tribe; and members not
 belonging to other tribes. These criteria largely were designed to fit the
 aboriginal image of the existing and recognized western tribes and were
 problematic for many eastern tribes that sought recognition."' As M. Annette
 Jaimes has complained, some of these requirements presented a catch-22: "An
 Indian is a member of any federally recognized Indian Tribe. ... To gain
 federal recognition, an Indian Tribe must have a land base. To secure a land
 base, an Indian Tribe must be federally recognized."'4
 Because of the problematic nature of many of these criteria, and
 Congress's impatience with a process that seemed interminable, unfair, and
 ponderous, the BIA was forced on February 25, 1994, to issue revised criteria.
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 The new criteria, it is alleged, are more in keeping with the contemporary
 condition of tribes seeking federal recognition. For instance, instead of
 requiring that the tribe be continuously identified as a distinctive Indian
 entity since "historical times," the criteria require only that there has existed
 an "American Indian entity on a substantially continuous basis since 1900."'"
 Also, the land requirement has been changed to require evidence of a "distinct
 community," a broader term that has in its meaning social as well as
 geographic ties. It is too early to ascertain the effect of these rules on the
 remaining petitioners.
 The significance of recognition is two-fold: First, federally recog-
 nized tribes are eligible for a number of federal benefits. These benefits
 include educational and medical services and exemption from many state
 taxes. Second, by recognizing an Indian tribe the federal government is
 affirming the legal position of its members as Indians. Without such
 recognition, an ethnically identified "Indian" may not be able to benefit from
 federal programs tailored for "legally-recognized" Indians. Monroe E. Price
 and Robert N. Clinton note that according to the 1982 amended regulations
 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 an Indian is defined as: (1) a
 member of a federally recognized tribe, (2) descendants of members of
 recognized tribes who were residing on an Indian reservation onJune 1, 1934,
 or (3) a person who has one half or more Indian blood.' This definition
 entails both an ethnological and a political/legal meaning. As Felix S. Cohen
 observed in his classic Handbook of Federal Indian Law,
 ethnologically, the Indian race may be distinguished from the
 Caucasian, Negro, Mongoloid, and other races. If a person is
 three-fourths Caucasian and one-fourth Indian, it is absurd, from
 the ethnological standpoint, to assign him to the Indian race. Yet
 legally such a person may be an Indian. From a legal standpoint,
 then, the biological question of race is generally pertinent, but
 not conclusive. Legal status depends not only upon biological,
 but also upon social factors, such as the relation of the individual
 concerned to a white or Indian community."
 Equally pertinent to our discussion is that when the United States deals with
 tribes in an intergovernmental way it has done so not on the basis of race, but
 on a political basis. This is to say, the United States treats with tribes as social-
 political groups towards which it has unique legal/political responsibilities
 because of the inherent sovereignty of each party.'"
 While Cohen's categorization of four racial groups has a number of
 problems scientifically, it remains a pertinent fact that for the purposes of
 federal Indian policy and law race coexists uneasily alongside the political basis
 (as exemplified in the hundreds of ratified treaties negotiated between tribes
 and the European nations and later the United States) as the defining factors
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 in the tribal-Western relationship. Price and Clinton and Cohen's definitions
 of "Indian" actually raise more questions than they answer. And since the
 term "tribe" has similar racial/political connotations, it also is problematic.
 For example, to what extent is the federal government's relationship with
 tribes based on race? On politics? Does this vary from tribe to tribe? From
 administration to administration? Does the United States have a legal and
 moral obligation to all indigenous groups, or only to those with whom it has
 maintained long-standing political (read: treaty) relations? Does the issue of
 "domicile" (geographic location) have any legitimate bearing on the tribal-
 federal relationship? Finally, should the issue of "federal recognition" be used
 to distinguish tribes apart from "state-recognition"? And if so, to what degree?
 We argue that the social construction of "Indianness" created by
 Euroamericans is among the most critical elements in determining which
 tribes will be recognized. What a person or group is perceived to be is just as
 much a function of subjective phenomena as of objective phenomena.
 Therefore, as we will demonstrate, the concepts of race, rights, obligations,
 and even domicile are as much dependent on the social construction put
 upon them as on their objective existence. The ability of an Indian tribe to
 become and remain a federally recognized tribe is dependent on how well that
 tribe "fits" the social construction of "Indian tribe" as perceived by federal
 officials.
 SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF GROUPS AND FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY:
 The literature on interest groups and public policy is extensive.
 Factors such as size and cohesiveness,19 resources,20 social status, 21and
 incentives22 have all been analyzed in attempts to explain the differential
 success rates of interest groups in policy formulation and implementation.
 But until recently the concept of the social construction of group identity has
 been overlooked as a factor in public policy analysis. The concept of group
 identity may be of little importance in a homogeneous society, in that
 everyone in the population has a similar racial, religious, or cultural identity.
 In a heterogeneous, pluralistic society, particularly one in which discrimina-
 tion based on racial or ethnic identity has been relatively common, group
 identity can be critical to the benefits or burdens levied on the group. The
 difficulty in addressing the impact of socially constructed identities of groups
 in the United States derives from the regime's commitment to liberalism.
 Lockean liberalism, upon which the United States Constitution is based,
 argues that governments are created to protect the individual natural rights
 of "life, liberty and property."23 Liberalism has been an attractive and
 successful political philosophy worldwide because it rejects the political
 legitimacy of most socially constructed group identities such as class and race.
 Yet despite philosophical and constitutional denial of group differences, in
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 practical politics they remain firmly entrenched. Behavioral scientists often
 use group identity (e.g. race, religion, gender, etc.) as explanatory factors in
 social analysis. The high explanatory power of these "identity" factors
 demonstrates their significance for study and discourse about political issues
 and theory.
 Identity politics is critical to understanding the background and
 intent of federal Indian policies. The term "Indian" itself is a social
 construction. Historians Robert F. BerkhoferJr.24 and Brian W. Dippie25 both
 argue that "Indian" is a social construction created by the European
 immigrants to America. According to Berkhofer, "The initial image of the
 Indian, like the word itself, came from the pen of Columbus."26 The Arawak
 people were described by Columbus as "well built and of handsome stature,"
 "marvellously timorous," "so guileless and so generous," and having a "very
 acute intelligence," in other words, he crafted the image of the "noble
 savage," the innocents of nature extolled by the later Romantic poets and
 philosophers.28 Columbus also originated the concept of the hostile and
 depraved "red devil" when he described the ferocious and cannibalistic
 Caribs. That image was permanently embedded in the European immigrants'
 impressions as well. The frontier stories of Indian "massacres" are but later
 examples of this same social construction of the indigenous inhabitants of
 the Americas.
 Dippie maintains that these images served to reflect the moral
 dichotomy of Euroamericans' lives. On the one hand, these settlers champi-
 oned the moral superiority of the civilization they were bringing to the
 wilderness and, on the other hand, they mourned the loss of innocence and
 virtue that civilization meant. Since the Indian represented the innocence of
 the lost wilderness to the white man, the Indian, by definition, could not
 continue to exist.29 So the myth of the "Vanishing American" was born.30
 Books like The Last of the Mohicans by James Fenimore Cooper and artistic
 depictions like The End of the Trail by James E. Fraser helped to cement this
 myth into the American culture.
 A curious aspect of these constructions was their timelessness. "In
 spite of centuries of contact and the changed conditions of Native American
 lives,"' Whites picture the 'real' Indian as the one before contact or during the
 early period of that contact."32 By creating an image that was "uncivilized"
 by European standards, the immigrant Americans were able to define away
 any Native Americans who adopted white culture. Federal Indian policy in
 the nineteenth century reflected these myths. Indians were removed to
 reservations where they were illegally confined until they had become suitably
 acculturated so that they could begin "productive" lives in the Euroamerican
 political/economic culture.
 In the attitudes of federal policymakers of the time, it was thought
 impossible for Indians to lead "productive lives" in their homelands.
 Reservations were considered little more than temporary detention colonies
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 where tribal members languished until such time as the communal land could
 be individually allotted. The 1887 General Allotment Act33 was the inaugu-
 rating policy which eventually culminated in the allotment of 118 of 213
 reservations by 1934, a gross reduction in indigenous land control from 138
 million acres to 52 million acres.34 Importantly, most of the land loss was a
 result of subsequent amendments to the allotment measure and in the specific
 congressional acts which subdivided reservations.35
 Alongside allotment, a number of devastating assimilation mea-
 sures-i.e., federally-funded Christian missionaries, exertions of criminal
 jurisdiction over reservation lands and residents, boarding school policies,
 among others-were introduced to Americanize indigenous peoples.3" As long
 as Indians maintained ties to their tribe or tribal homeland, they were denied
 status as "Americans," entitled to the full panoply of federal benefits and
 protections. Federal citizenship prior to the 1924 Indian citizenship law37 was
 conferred only upon those who accepted an allotment (or who, preferably,
 left the reservation altogether). With citizenship, Indians became subject to
 state law.38 But even in cases where Indians voluntarily left the reservations"
 or where they had received individual land allotments,40 they were still denied
 full citizenship rights and benefits because, according to the Supreme Court,
 they "remained Indians by race." Although Indians were unilaterally ex-
 tended federal citizenship in 1924 and have since World War II been at least
 nominally integrated into the general Euroamerican political culture, the
 myth persists that the only "real Indian" is the "aborigine he once was, or as
 they imagine he once was."41
 It is important to note that the social construction of indigenous
 Americans, involving more than 540 distinctive groups, as "Indians" has
 persisted without input from the Native Americans themselves who tradition-
 ally, and in many cases still today, regard themselves primarily in terms of
 their tribal affiliation rather than in terms of "Indianness" or political
 allegiance to the United States or the states. Early European explorers and
 settlers homogenized the vastly heterogeneous tribes under the misnomer
 "Indians" despite their knowledge of the myriad languages and customs of
 the tribes. The rise of the nation-state in Europe made Europeans sensitive to
 differences among themselves. This sensitivity, however, was not extended to
 non-Western peoples.
 Only in the last two decades has there been serious reevaluation of
 the concepts of race and ethnicity by the Census Bureau,"42 anthropologists,
 and others. For much of the twentieth century, schools taught that there were
 three races: Caucasoid, Mongoloid, and Negroid. The category Mongoloid
 was then divided into two racial groups, Asians and Native Americans. Recent
 scientific scholarship categorically demonstrates that physiognomy and skin
 color are useless measures of race, and that the concept of race itself is more
 a process of self identification and social construction than physical
 characteristics. Nevertheless, the ongoing tendency by a number of federal
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 agencies to treat Indian tribes monolithically is based on the obsolete and,
 more importantly, fictitious concept of "the" mythic, aboriginal Indian.
 However, by socially constructing a mythic Indian and then measuring
 demands for recognition against it, federal recognition seems more often to
 depend on how many Aboriginal traits the petitioning tribe retains in
 common with the mythic notion of "Indian" or "tribe."
 The social construction of the Aboriginal Indian has "benefited"
 Western tribes more than the Eastern tribes. The western tribes (excepting the
 Southwestern groups, and their long history of interactions with the Spanish)
 had later contact with European culture; thus they have been able to retain
 more of their pre-Columbian cultures and much of their ancestral lands. The
 Northwest tribes who treated with Great Britain over trade developed quite
 different intergovernmental relations than those that evolved between the
 British, the colonies, and the Eastern tribes.43 By the time the United States
 treated with the Western tribes, the policy of removal (1830s-1840s) was being
 replaced by the reservation system. While reserved land had been used by the
 British Crown during colonial times, it was not until the 1850s, when the
 policy of removal became impossible because of the westward migration of
 Americans to Oregon, California, and other Western regions, that the United
 States began as a general policy to set aside or "reserve" lands for its
 indigenous inhabitants.4 Many eastern Indian communities were biologi-
 cally, materially, and culturally transformed by the British and American
 experience to the point where they no longer fit the "image" of the "Indian"-
 that is, the western Indian-which by the twentieth century was well ingrained
 in the minds of federal policymakers.
 Hence, eastern tribes have often had a difficult time convincing the
 federal government (and their neighbors) that they remained "indigenous"
 and were entitled to comparable recognition and benefits as their western
 cousins. In fact, there is evidence45 that the intention of certain federal
 lawmakers in the 1930s for narrowing the "blood quantum"46 requirement
 from one-half to one-quarter during Indian reorganization was to reduce the
 number of Indians eligible for federal services, while maintaining a policy
 that the more "primitive" and "ancient" tribes like the Hopi, Navajo, and
 Tohono-O'odham needed ongoing federal tutelage in the form of education,
 cultural activities, and technical support, to facilitate their gradual assimila-
 tion into the American mainstream.
 Two additional factors are particularly salient when examining the
 persistence of the federal government's efforts in attempting to assimilate
 Indians by destroying their cultures and religions. The first is land ownership.
 The tribes held lands coveted by the United States and her citizens for
 settlement or for their natural resources. In order to legally acquire title to the
 land and its attendant resources, federal policymakers, the press, state
 governments, railroad interests, and others had to eliminate the Indian title.
 It was easier, less expensive, and more moral to do this by allotting
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 reservations and forcibly assimilating Indians rather than attempting an
 extermination policy that would have violated the very principles on which
 the United States was founded. Other racial minorities held no comparable
 economic leverage/burden to the budding hegemony of Euroamericans.
 African-Americans, Asian-Americans, and Hispanics were often segregated or
 simply denied any chance to assimilate.
 The second factor to be considered is the level of group solidarity
 exhibited by the Native American tribes. Most tribes were quite cohesive
 social, economic, and political units. The national or tribal ties to ancestral
 lands and culture of other minority groups within the United States were
 generally broken by the immigration process or, in the case of African-
 Americans, by slavery. Since Native Americans still had some physical power
 over their traditional lands, as well as a functioning social and political unit,
 the only way to overcome Native Americans' collective resistance was to
 eliminate the tribal unit and disperse the individuals. The General Allotment
 Act of 188747 and House Concurrent Resolution 10848-the Termination
 Resolution-were both attempts by the federal government to accomplish
 this.
 FACTORS OF SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION IMPORTANT FOR RECOGNITION:
 The above discussion leads us to suggest that the following four
 factors are of particular importance in affecting the success or failure of a tribe
 to gain federal recognition.
 1. How well the tribe and its members meet the social construc-
 tion of the image of an Indian. The model of social construction
 proposed by Scheider and Ingram lends weight to earlier suggestions
 that the image policymakers have of a group will have a profound
 impact on the policies that are directed toward the group. Since social
 constructions continually evolve, we believe the time period in which
 recognition is sought will affect both the characteristics of the social
 construction and the ability of the tribe to meet that image.49 We
 hypothesize that tribes whose members exhibit the most cultural and
 physical attributes of the mythic, aboriginal "Indian" will have the
 greatest likelihood of being acknowledged with federal recognition.
 2. How cohesive is the self-identity of the tribes' members? Self-
 identification is a crucial element in the construction of an image by
 others. If the tribe has a well-defined social image, it will have a better
 chance of projecting that image effectively to others. The more
 ambiguity there is in the tribe's self-image, the more room there will
 be for projection of traits onto that group by others. We suggest tribes
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 that are internally cohesive with a well-developed tribal image will be
 more successful in pressing their demands for recognition than those
 that are not.
 3. The general public's perception of the legitimacy of the
 benefits or burdens directed toward a target population. The
 moral value of the perceived rewards or punishments are important
 here. The more the general public perceives a tribe as legitimately
 "Indian" and morally due its benefits, the greater the likelihood of
 success. An established record of broken treaties and historically
 harsh treatment of tribal citizens lends greater legitimacy to claims
 against the system. As Schneider and Ingram note, "Social construc-
 tions become part of the reelection calculus when public officials
 anticipate the reaction of the target population itself to the policy
 and also anticipate the reaction of others to whether the target group
 should be the beneficiary (or loser) for a particular policy proposal."50
 Since federal recognition provides significant benefits to the tribe
 and tribal members, we hypothesize that the tribe's demands for
 acknowledgment must be considered legitimate by the general public,
 including other Indian tribes, if the tribe is to be successful.
 4. What are the tribes resources that can be used in support of
 its recognition efforts? Interest group theory would lead us to
 predict that factors such as size, wealth, and social status are
 positively associated with successful efforts. For tribes that are
 alienated from the system," or have been negatively constructed,52
 then the use of threats is the most likely lobbying tactic.53 Tribes
 constructed as "dependent" have fewer resources to bring to bear in
 lobbying efforts but have a positive climate in which to use those
 resources. In keeping with interest group theory and Scheider and
 Ingram's model, we hypothesize that those tribes with greater
 resources, i.e., population, wealth, land, etc., will be more likely to be
 recognized by the federal government because they can bring more
 resources to the effort of lobbying the Congress.
 In the next two sections we will use these factors to analyze the history
 of the Catawba and Lumbee campaigns for federal recognition.
 CATAWBA TRIBE:
 On November 10, 1763, King George III of England ceded the
 Catawba Tribe of South Carolina a tract of land "fifteen miles square"
 comprising about 144,000 acres in the Treaty of Augusta (Georgia).54 The
 Catawba were treated well because they had had a long-term friendship with
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 the English that included sending men to fight alongside Colonel George
 Washington in the French and Indian War and alongside the English in the
 Cherokee War. Though the Catawba were not completely satisfied with the
 Treaty of Augusta, it was accepted and became the basis for the Catawba land
 claims and recognition demands 230 years later.
 European settlers began moving onto the Catawba Reservation
 sometime before the Revolutionary War. One of the first European settlers
 among the Catawba was Thomas "Kanawha" Spratt II who settled on the land
 near present-day Fort Mill about 1761. Though Spratt got along well with his
 Catawba neighbors, he soon began selling parcels of the land the Catawbas
 had leased him to other non-Indians. Within a few years almost all of the most
 fertile tracts within the reservation had been leased to English colonists. In
 1782, after boundary disputes arose, the leaseholders agreed to have all the
 lands surveyed, platted, and recorded. That same year, the Catawba petitioned
 Congress to secure their land so it would not be "Intruded into by force, nor
 alienated even with their own consent."55 Not wanting to deal with the tribe,
 Congress the following year passed a resolution stating that the British title
 over the Catawba Nation had passed into the hands of South Carolina.
 Congress recommended that South Carolina "take such measures for the
 satisfaction and security of the said tribe as the said legislature shall, in their
 wisdom, think fit."''56 Thus the Catawba nation became beneficiaries of a trust
 relationship with South Carolina rather than the United States. Ironically, the
 Cherokee, who had sided with the British during the Revolutionary War, were
 federally recognized and taxes from Fort Mill on the Catawba Reservation
 were sent to support them while the Catawba were left to their own resources.
 Settlers continued to invade Catawba lands and by the early 1800s
 most of their remaining land had been leased. The non-Indian leaseholders
 worried about the permanence of their leases, so in 1838 South Carolina
 Governor Patrick Noble authorized commissioners to enter into negotia-
 tions with the Catawbas for the sale of their land. The Catawbas were willing
 to part with full title if the state provided enough money for land acquisition
 near the Cherokee in North Carolina. In 1840 the Catawba Nation and the
 State of South Carolina entered into the Treaty of Nation Ford. The treaty
 provided that the Catawbas would cede the land granted to them under the
 Treaty of Augusta in 1763 in return for
 a tract of land of the value of $5,000, 300 acres of which is to be
 good arable lands fit for cultivation, to be purchased in Haywood
 County, North Carolina, or in some other mountainous or
 thinly populated region, where the said Indians may desire, and if
 no such tract can be procured to their satisfaction, they shall be
 entitled to receive the foregoing amount in cash from the state.
 The Commissioners further engage that the State shall
 pay the said Catawba Indians $2,500 at or immediately after the
 AMERICAN INDIAN QUARTERLY/SUMMER 1995/VOL. 19(3) 371
This content downloaded from 141.166.178.205 on Wed, 11 Dec 2019 14:09:32 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 MCCULLOCH AND WILKINS
 time of their removal, and $1,500 each year thereafter, for the
 space of nine years ... 57
 Unfortunately, in its haste to remove the Catawba, South Carolina
 had neglected to secure North Carolina's permission to have the Catawba
 moved to the Cherokee reservation. When the permission was belatedly
 requested, North Carolina refused. Some Catawba journeyed to the Cherokee
 reservation and did live there for a time but old tribal jealousies and the stress
 suffered by the remaining Cherokee as a result of the "Trail of Tears" tragedy
 prevented them from making a permanent home with the Cherokee.
 Eventually, most of the Catawbas found themselves back on their former soil
 but without land or money. The settlement of $2,500 and the annual payment
 of $1,500 promised them under the 1840 Treaty were withheld by the state
 because the Catawba had returned to the land. The plight of the Catawbas led
 South Carolina Indian AgentJoseph White to secure for them in 1843 a tract
 of 630 acres near the center of the "Old Reservation."58
 South Carolina and the United States continued to try to rid
 themselves of the "Catawba problem." During the Removal, Congress
 appropriated money in 1848 and again in 1854 in an effort to remove the
 Catawba west of the Mississippi. In the meantime, Governor Seabrook of
 South Carolina was trying to get the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to
 underwrite the outstanding debt of $18,000 owed by South Carolina to the
 Catawba. As early as the 1840s the Catawba realized that they had been
 defrauded but it was not until the 1880s that the tribe retained lawyers to
 investigate their claims against South Carolina. In 1905 the Catawba
 launched their legal battle to recover their lands, arguing that the 1840 Treaty
 of Nation Ford was null and void because it violated the Indian Nonintercourse
 Acts" which required submission of all land transactions involving tribal
 lands to Congress.
 The tribe had been able to maintain its internal cohesiveness and
 social identity throughout the nineteenth century despite the lack of federal
 or state protection because of several factors acknowledged by BIA Special
 Indian Agent Charles Davis in a report to the agency dated January 5, 1911.60
 These factors included, among others, size, tribal organization, religion, and
 character. At the time he was writing, ninety-seven individuals lived on or near
 the Catawba reservation who were recognized by South Carolina as being
 members of the Catawba Tribe. One-hundred and ten individuals were
 recognized as members by the tribe, the discrepancy hinging on a matrilineal
 descent requirement by the state. Davis noted that the small tribe had not
 intermarried much with their white neighbors and not at all with their black
 neighbors, thus "[t]he large majority are so nearly full blood as to retain the
 Indian characteristics, and by reason thereof they have retained their tribal
 life and organization.... This tribe has maintained a tribal organization for
 all time, so far as can be ascertained now. And the State [sic] has seemingly
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 always recognized their tribal character."6'' Religion was another factor he
 discussed as having some impact on the tribe's internal cohesion. Most
 Catawba tribal members had converted to the Mormon religion twenty to
 thirty years earlier and had continued in that religion during a time when
 there were violent activities against Mormons in South Carolina.62 Despite
 poverty, lack of schooling, and general neglect by the State, the Catawba tribe
 was still regarded by Davis as ranking very high in regard to integrity.6 The
 tribe's solidarity, acknowledged both internally and externally, helped to
 support the perseverance needed to pursue its legal claims against South
 Carolina.
 The tribe persisted in its campaign in the courts and in Congress
 until 1934 when the South Carolina Legislature passed a resolution recom-
 mending that the care and maintenance of the Catawba Indians should be
 transferred to the United States. It was not until 1943 that a Memorandum
 of Understanding was signed between the tribe, the state, and the Department
 of Interior. South Carolina acquired 3,434 acres of farmland for a federal
 reservation. The tribe adopted a constitution under the Indian Reorganiza-
 tion Act, and the federal government assumed its trust responsibility over
 tribal affairs.64
 The Catawba's federal recognition was short-lived. In keeping with
 the federal government's termination philosophy instituted in 195365 the
 Catawba tribe was approached in 1958 by both the BIA and South Carolina
 with a proposal for termination. The BIA agent at the time assured the
 Catawba that their long-standing land claim against the state based on the
 Treaty of Augusta and the Treaty of Nation Ford (which still had not been
 resolved) would be unaffected by the termination. Thus, in 1962 the federal
 trust relationship between the United States and the Catawba tribe was
 terminated. The 3,434 acre federal reservation was divided up and distributed
 to tribal members. South Carolina continued to hold the 640 acre tract from
 the 1840 treaty in trust for the tribe. At the time of termination, there were
 631 enrolled members.66
 The activism of the American Indian Movement in the early 1970s
 served to reignite the determination of the Catawbas-and many other tribes-
 to reinstitute claims. The tribe contacted the Native American Rights Fund,
 and in 1976 papers were filed with the Department of Interior to recover the
 land recognized under the 1763 Treaty of Augusta. Negotiations were
 proceeding between the tribe, South Carolina, and the United States when
 two events in December 1977 dashed all hopes of resolution. First, the local
 paper obtained and published tribal maps identifying specific parcels of land
 the tribe and state were considering for a reservation. Threatened non-Indian
 landowners quickly organized the Tri-County Landowners Association with
 the intention of stopping any settlement by asking Congress to extinguish the
 land claim in return for a monetary payment. Second, the increased publicity
 of the pending land claims led to demands by nonresident tribal members
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 who wanted to join in the action in hopes of securing land, benefits, or both.
 Negotiations stalled. The impasse continued until 1980 when the tribe filed
 suit in federal district court to recover possession of the 1763 treaty
 reservation.
 In 1982, SeniorJudge Joseph P. Wilson67 dismissed the Catawba's case
 on the basis that the ten-year state statute of limitations for claims had
 expired-it being twenty years since the Catawbas' 1962 termination. The
 Fourth Circuit, however, reversed the decision arguing that termination did
 not affect the 1763 reservation. The State appealed to the United States
 Supreme Court. In the meantime the Solicitor for the United States
 Department of Justice under the Reagan Administration switched sides and
 filed an amicus curiae brief in support of South Carolina. The Supreme Court
 reversed the Fourth Circuit by ruling that termination did make the land
 claim subject to state law and then remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit
 to determine what the impact would be on the tribe's claim.6"
 The Fourth Circuit Court in 1989 found that there was still some
 standing for the claim. South Carolina law concerning adverse possession of
 real property limits claims to ten years when there has been continuous
 occupancy of the land by the trespasser, and to twenty years if the land has
 changed hands during that period."9 The twenty-year limit (1962-1982) meant
 that a substantial amount of the land claimed would still be subject to
 litigation since the clock had stopped running on the claim when the tribe
 filed suit in 1980. It was estimated that sixty percent of the original 27,000
 land owners were still subject to litigation by the tribe. Most real estate
 transactions in York County, home of the Catawba claims, were held up
 because of the unwillingness of mortgage companies to provide title
 insurance.
 At this point Congressman John Spratt (a descendent of Thomas
 "Kanawha" Spratt), Governor Carroll Campbell, and Secretary of the Interior
 Manuel Lujan expressed their interest in a settlement. Negotiations began
 again in 1990 and continued through 1991, until South Carolina's interest
 faded after both the Federal District and Appeals Court denied the Catawba's
 petition for a class-action suit. It seems South Carolina and the landowners
 believed they could win the case by outlasting the tribe. With the clock
 running on the twenty-year statute of limitations (the clock had been restarted
 in 1991 when Judge Wilson refused the class-action petition), the tribe
 decided to proceed with its claim, and NARF attorneys began preparations
 to serve papers on 61,767 individual occupants of the disputed claim area.
 This action prompted immediate interest on the part of South
 Carolina and land holders in renewed negotiations. To facilitate negotiations,
 Congress enacted legislation extending the statute of limitation for an
 additional year to October 1, 1993. The tribe established the date of
 September 2, 1993 as the deadline. If agreement had not been reached by that
 date, they argued, the summons would be mailed. On January 5, 1993, H.R.
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 2399, the Catawba Indian Tribe of South Carolina Land Claims Settlement
 Act of 1993, was introduced into Congress by Congressman John Spratt.
 Negotiations were resumed in good faith and on February 20, 1993 the tribe
 voted 289 to 42 to accept the settlement.70 Congress passed the act that
 summer and the final agreement was signed by South Carolina Governor
 Carroll Campbell on November 29, 1994 at the Catawba Reservation."
 The settlement provided for the following: The trust relationship
 between the Catawba Indian Tribe and the United States would be restored,
 the tribe would become a federally recognized tribe, and its members would
 be eligible for federal benefits. The United States and South Carolina would
 contribute $50 million dollars over a period of five years to be put into five
 trust funds: Land Acquisition Trust, Economic Development Trust, Social
 Services and Elderly Assistance Trust, Education Trust and a Per Capita
 Payment Trust to be managed by the Secretary of the Interior. The tribe was
 given ten years to expand the existing reservation to 3,000 acres, plus 600 acres
 of wetlands or undeveloped land. Tribal jurisdiction was recognized over
 basic governmental powers, including zoning, misdemeanors, business
 regulation, taxation, and membership. Tribal membership would be based on
 direct descendency from the 1961 Federal Catawba Roll. South Carolina,
 however, reserved the right to continue to exercise criminal jurisdiction over
 Indians and non-Indians on the reservation. Finally, the tribe was exempted
 from the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.72
 The victory for the Catawbas was as welcomed as it was incomplete.
 Some tribes complained that the Catawbas gave too much of their sovereign
 powers to the state. However, after 153 years of negotiation, legislation, and
 litigation (the final litigation process having been continuously in the federal
 courts for seventeen years), it appeared that the settlement was at least
 sufficient. The Catawbas were able to recover their status as a federally
 recognized tribe and their land base was expanded and confirmed. The fact
 that both issues were so clearly drawn by the long-standing claim and the
 cohesiveness of the tribe in pressing that claim helped to cement the
 perception that the Catawbas were still a tribe. Conversely, the fact that they
 were so acculturated into the Euroamerican system and had lived so long
 under South Carolina law negatively affected their ability to reclaim criminal
 and regulatory powers from the state. In the areas that the Catawbas managed
 to fit the image of the "real" Indian, they were successful; in areas where they
 seemed too "westernized" and assimilated, they lost. The losses were sustained
 because the claims were not considered legitimate.
 LUMBEE TRIBE:
 The Lumbee Nation, numbering about 39,000, are a majority of
 Robeson County's indigenous population. According to Robert K. Thomas,
 the noted Cherokee anthropologist, genetically the Lumbee people (the term
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 Lumbee, we shall see shortly, is of recent vintage) are the descendants of
 remnants of several small Southeastern tribes: the Hatteras, Saponi, and
 Cheraw, who from the 1780s through the 1840s worked their way into
 Robeson County where they intermarried and gradually developed a distinc-
 tive tribal identity.7 This account of Lumbee origins, however, directly
 contradicts the most prominent theory of Lumbee roots that posits that the
 Hatteras Indians living on the Outer Banks of North Carolina intermarried
 with John White's "Lost Colony" of Roanoke Island sometime in the late
 1500s.74 The latest Lumbee "origin" theory asserts that the Lumbees are
 primarily descended from the Cheraw Tribe of South Carolina and related
 Siouan speakers who were said to have inhabited the area now known as
 Robeson County since the later eighteenth century." These conflicting origin
 theories have contributed in no small part to some of the identity questions
 Lumbees have confronted internally. Since we are focusing, in part, on how
 important the federal government's social construction of "Indian identity"
 is, we will see that these socio-cultural questions have clearly discernible
 political manifestations.
 Interestingly, there are six other groups in Robeson County that
 insist they also are distinctive political-cultural tribal polities. This tribal
 differentiation-the separation of Robeson County's indigenous population
 into several politically, though not genetically, disparate groups-and the
 ramifications of this segmentation for internal tribal dynamics and
 intergovernmental relations is a powerful dynamic affecting the Lumbees'
 quest for federal acknowledgment. This is arguably the most persistent
 conundrum confronting the county's indigenous population, especially as it
 pertains to the tribe's efforts to project a common tribal identity that might
 facilitate federal recognition. The Lumbee's leadership understands, in other
 words, that it is crucially important for recognition purposes that they be able
 to meet, or at least give the appearance of having met, the extant Anglo social
 construction of what a "tribe" should appear to be like: that is a tight, fairly
 cohesive unit lacking any disruption to their common identity.
 The non-Lumbee indigenous population of the county, however, is
 less concerned about satisfying the federal government's social construction,
 and seems more intent on satisfying the perception of other tribes, particu-
 larly established Northeastern tribes like those constituting the Iroquois
 Confederacy. This has contributed to the proliferation of disparate organi-
 zations-six in all, besides the Lumbee Tribe.7 Most of these groups have
 adopted the name Tuscarora as part of their tribal designation, because the
 Tuscarora Tribe for several centuries inhabited portions of eastern North
 Carolina before they were defeated in battles with North Carolina colonists.
 The bulk of the tribe departed for New York in the early 1700s.
 Each of these six other groups is pursuing an independent path
 toward federal recognition. This is not the forum, however, to detail the
 controversial developments leading to this recent proliferation of groups.
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 This splintering and the lack of consensus among the competing political, yet
 biologically related, groups have made it much more difficult for the
 Lumbees or the other groups to secure federal acknowledgment.
 This has been most evident since the latest administrative and
 legislative recognition began in the late 1980s. Before then, the Lumbee tribe
 generally understood itself internally and presented itself externally as a
 relatively cohesive people. However, since the formation of the first splinter
 group, the Eastern Carolina Tuscarora Organization in 1970, this cohesion
 has been shattered. Thus, when the early versions of the Lumbee recognition
 bill were introduced in Congress during the 1980s, the measures were
 vigorously opposed not only by some other tribes and BIA officials, but also
 by the non-Lumbee indigenous groups. The general fear of these tribal
 fragments was that they would be subsumed under the Lumbee tribe and
 would not be allowed to petition the federal government separately.
 This indigenous segmentation also creates uncertainty and confu-
 sion among outsiders about Lumbee identity. For instance, the federally
 recognized Eastern Band of Cherokee has been a stalwart opponent of
 Lumbee recognition. In part, its resistance results from the historical fact that
 the Lumbees were misnamed Cherokees of Robeson County by non-Indians
 and that at least one segment of contemporary Robeson County Indians still
 identifies itself as "Cherokee." Jonathan Taylor, a former Eastern Cherokee
 chief, said in testimony against the Lumbee recognition bill in 1988 that
 "there are only two Cherokee Tribes; one of them is in North Carolina [the
 Eastern Band] and the other one is in Oklahoma [the Cherokee Nation of
 Oklahoma].""
 Notwithstanding the importance of tribal segmentation, we concen-
 trate on the Lumbee for several reasons: first, the Lumbee tribe dwarfs the
 other factions and all other non-recognized Indian tribes; second, the
 Lumbees are one of a handful of tribal groups that was informed by the
 associate solicitor of Indian affairs of the Department of Interior that they
 were precluded from using the administrative process for recognition
 established by the BIA in 1978; and third, a focus on the Lumbees is warranted
 because their original (1956) acknowledgment legislation arose during the
 termination era when the United States unilaterally severed its political
 relationship with a number of tribes. The termination years have since been
 replaced by self-determination and a majority of the tribes and Indian groups
 that were terminated in the 1950s and 1960s have since been restored to
 federal status. The Lumbee Tribe remains, politically speaking, frozen in
 time-connected to an aberrant federal policy that has since been forcefully
 repudiated by the Congress and the executive branch.
 The Lumbee Nation, unlike the Catawba Nation, which has had
 bilateral political dealings with European nations, the colony (later state) of
 South Carolina, and the federal government since the 1700s, has been in
 active pursuit of either federal acknowledgment or federal aid for a little more
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 than 100 years. The Lumbee's initial contact with the federal government was
 in 1888 when the tribe's leadership petitioned Congress for education aid.
 The Commissioner of Indian Affairs denied the tribe's request on the grounds
 that North Carolina already was providing some money for the Indians'
 education and because the BIA maintained that it did not have enough money
 to meet the "recognized" tribes' needs.
 And unlike the Catawba, who had long-standing dealings with South
 Carolina from the colonial period, the Lumbees relations with North
 Carolina were of a more recent vintage. This is the result of several factors.
 The Lumbees were a relatively small and powerless tribe during the formative
 years when the colonial, later state government, was evolving. The Lumbees'
 predecessors settled in an area of North Carolina that enabled them to avoid
 prolonged contact with colonial/state government. They largely were ignored
 by the federal government because they posed no military threat to the United
 States or American settlers, they did not inhabit lands deemed desirable, and
 they were perceived to have been an incorporated tribe in relation to the state's
 political and economic infrastructure.
 Collectively, the Lumbee tribe had few formal political dealings with
 the state before the 1860s. This era of nonpolitical relations began to change
 after the Civil War when the legislature enacted a law that provided for
 separate white and Negro schools. The Lumbees then sought political redress
 from the state because they were denied admittance to white schools and
 refused to send their children to Negro schools."
 Gradually, the county's Democratic leadership, became aware of the
 tribe's growing voting potential. North Carolina's response was enactment of
 a law in 1885 which acknowledged the Lumbee as the Croatan Indians of
 Robeson County. What this law did was establish a separate school system for
 tribal members. The Lumbees (Croatans) were able to parlay their growing
 political clout into additional state legislation that established the Croatan
 Normal School, which was under exclusive Indian control.
 By the early 1900s, the term Croatan had attained a pejorative
 connotation, with local whites often shortening it to "Cro," short for "Jim
 Crow," the vernacular term for institutionalized racial segregation. The
 Croatans perceived this as a racial slur and requested a different tribal name.
 In 1911 the legislature enacted a law that deleted the now-despised word
 "Croatan" and simply inserted the generic term "Indian." They were
 henceforth to be known as "Indians of Robeson County."
 This terminology proved unsatisfactory as well and, in 1913, anxious
 to be defined culturally and socially as distinct from others, they were given
 yet another name. This time they were designated as "Cherokee Indians of
 Robeson County." This resulted from the contention of some historians and
 anthropologists who argued that some western North Carolina Cherokees
 had intermarried with the Indians of Robeson County during the Revolu-
 tionary War.79
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 Officially, the "Cherokee" designation remained on the state's
 statute books, and over the Eastern band of Cherokees' strenuous objections,
 until the 1950s, when the name Lumbee was adopted. In the early 1930s, there
 had been another legislative push, this one on the federal level, to rename the
 Robeson County Indians. The term bandied about was "Cheraw," an
 historical tribe inhabiting north-central South Carolina. Research on the
 Cheraw connection was conducted by the noted anthropologist Dr. John P.
 Swanton of the Smithsonian Institution. At the time it was the most
 historically accurate and detailed to date. Swanton argued that the Indians of
 Robeson County were "descended mainly from certain Siouan Tribes of
 which the most prominent were the Cheraw and Keyauwee.8"" He proposed
 the name "Siouan Indians of Lumber River." This measure, however, was
 opposed by the BIA who argued that it would entitle the tribe's fairly
 substantial membership to federal services. Ultimately the measure was
 tabled.
 In the early 1950s, a campaign was begun by several prominent local
 Indians to have the tribe's name changed again. The Reverend Doctor F.
 Lowry, the leader of this movement, argued that because the tribe was
 comprised of members from various tribes, no single historical name was
 appropriate. He suggested that the tribe adopt a more geographically-based
 name. The name chosen was "Lumbee," which was derived from the Lumber
 River that flows through the county. In 1953 North Carolina enacted a law
 designating the people as the "Lumbee Indians of North Carolina.""' This law
 often is interpreted as an extension of "recognition," but a credible case can
 be made that the state still had not explicitly defined the services to which the
 tribe was entitled, the immunities to which recognition entitled the tribe, and
 the aspects of self-government the state was willing to acknowledge.82
 After the Lumbees were acknowledged by North Carolina, they then
 launched their drive for federal recognition. Three years later, onJune 7, 1956,
 Congress passed "An Act Relating to the Lumbee Indians of North Caro-
 lina."8- The federal law used language nearly identical to that of the state law.
 However, at the request of the Department of Interior-the agency spearhead-
 ing the national termination policy-an exclusionary clause was inserted
 providing that "nothing in this Act shall make such Indians eligible for any
 services performed by the United States for Indians because of their status as
 Indians, and none of the statutes of the United States which affect Indians
 because of their status as Indians shall be applicable to the Lumbee Indians."84
 Ironically, then, the 1956 federal law acknowledged the Lumbees as
 a distinctive tribe, yet simultaneously precluded them from the federal
 services and protection generally provided to other acknowledged tribes. In
 other words, the tribe was recognized and terminated in the same legislation.
 The Lumbees made several sporadic efforts to have the restrictive
 language excised in the 1970s, all to no avail. It was not, however, until 1988
 that the tribe decided to go full speed for the establishment of diplomatic
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 relations. Bills have been introduced in every Congress since then to extend
 the full range of federal benefits and sanctions to the Lumbee tribe. To date,
 each bill has been defeated.
 While the end to the Lumbee's quest is closer than ever (the House
 in 1993 passed the measure), there are no guarantees that it will be enacted
 anytime soon with the Republicans steering Congress toward less govern-
 ment and lower federal expenditures. The overwhelming preponderance of
 evidence suggests that the Lumbee tribe meets most of the ethnological and
 legal-political criteria that the federal government uses to determine the
 Indian groups to which it has obligations. Yet it retains a nebulous status as
 a quasi-recognized tribe.
 ANALYSIS OF RECOGNITION FACTORS:
 In this last section we return to our social construction model and
 comparatively assess the political "success" of the Catawbas, in contrast to the
 political "defeats" of the Lumbees.
 Social Construction of the Tribe:
 There have been nearly 300 years of relations between the Catawba
 Tribe, South Carolina and the United States. Since before the French and
 Indian Wars, South Carolina has had formal government-to-government
 relations with the Catawbas. Although the state had tried several times to
 terminate the relationship, the social construction was one of an established
 Indian tribe.
 On the other hand, the major argument used by Lumbee opponents
 is their contention that the Lumbee "lack" certain "genetic" and "cultural"
 features which other recognized tribes are said to possess. Thomas noted this
 in his 1980 study and said that many local whites and some other tribes
 express the opinion that Lumbees are not "real" Indians. In other words, they
 are perceived as not being a "pure genetic race, they do not have a distinctive
 aboriginal language, and they lack a 'distinct tribal religion.'""' This is a
 perception that dates back to the nineteenth century and continues today
 even when contradicted by solid historical, anthropological, and political
 evidence. The matter is further complicated by the fact that the Lumbees
 "present themselves as members of different tribes [i.e. the six other Indian
 groups in the county], which causes some confusion on the part of many
 Indians of other tribes.""'
 Karen Blu's 1980 study, The Lumbee Problem: The Making of an
 American Indian People,87 which focused on the political and legal history of
 the Lumbees, essentially argued that Lumbee political activities have been
 affected by the "interplay between their own and others' conceptions of who
 they are."""88 More importantly, her work posited that Lumbee ethnic identity-
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 which is a blend of several tribes with an unquantifiable but discernible
 amount of Euroamerican and African-American ancestry-by "lacking what
 are thought to be 'traditional' Indian customs and traits, that Indianness is
 based in an orientation toward life, a sense of the past, 'a state of mind.' It
 is a way of doing and being that is 'Indian,' not what is done or the blood
 quantum of the doer.""" This unique brand of indigenous identity is a central
 factor that has precluded the Lumbee people from securing federal acknowl-
 edgment.
 Additionally, because the Lumbees did not sign treaties with colo-
 nial, state, or federal powers (political recognition), and since they have never
 inhabited a reservation (territorial dimension), these factors are sometimes
 weighed against them as further evidence that the Lumbees are not a
 legitimate tribe.
 Social cohesiveness:
 There are at least three factors contributing to the maintenance of the
 continued social cohesion of the Catawba tribe. First, outsiders accord the
 tribe legitimacy. Second, importance has been placed on continuing the
 traditional cultural arts of the tribe, particularly pottery from the clay of the
 Catawba River bottoms, despite having lost title to most of the land wherein
 the clay is found. The Catawba are the only Eastern tribe to have continued,
 uninterrupted, pottery making using the traditional designs and the same clay
 used by their ancestors. One tribal member credited the survival of the tribe
 during the Great Depression to pottery, as it was the only income-producing
 activity the tribal members had during that period." The third factor was
 religion. Although the Catawba were exposed to Christian missionaries since
 the early 1700s, it was not until Mormon missionaries approached the tribe
 in the 1880s that many Catawba converted to Christianity. A report from
 1934 noted that ninety-five percent of the 300 tribal members participated in
 Mormon services. The Mormon affiliation contributed to social cohesion
 through church participation, a banding together for protection, and a sense
 of uniqueness."
 The fact that the Lumbees are a melange of several tribes appears to
 be an inherent weakness in their social cohesion from the federal government's
 perspective. The recognition process seems to prefer tribes with a long
 historical track record, even though it was European colonization that
 scattered the original tribes and destroyed their internal governing structures.
 Nevertheless, the Lumbees have developed, over a relatively short period of
 time, a fairly strong internal cohesion. However, the contemporary fragmen-
 tation which has erupted within the tribe has caused severe intertribal and
 intergovernmental problems.
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 Perception of the Legitimacy of Tribal Benefits:
 The United States history of severed treaties and broken promises
 with American Indian tribes has generated a reservoir of sympathy toward
 Indians. In the case of the Catawbas, the failure by South Carolina to live up
 to its treaty obligations was well-documented and contributed to public
 empathy for the Catawbas. The major roadblock toward resolution of the
 claim was the time that had elapsed and the number of people involved in
 the claim as a result of the centuries of inequitable treatment. But as Justice
 Blackmun stated in his dissent in South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe:
 When an Indian Tribe has been assimilated and dispersed
 to this extent-and when, as the majority points out, thousands of
 people now claim interest in the Tribe's ancestral homeland...
 the Tribe's claim to that land may seem ethereal, and the manner
 of the Tribe's dispossession may seem of no more than historical
 interest. But the demands of justice do not cease simply because a
 wronged people grow less distinctive, or because the rights of
 innocent third parties must be taken into account ... I agree with
 Justice Black that "[g]reat nations, like great men, should keep
 their word.92
 The perception of the legitimacy of the Lumbee claim for benefits,
 on the other hand, is problematic for the reasons listed above. Although the
 tribe has garnered a great deal of support over the years, there is still the
 perception that the Lumbees simply have not fared as poorly as tribes with
 whom the United States negotiated and then subsequently broke treaties. In
 other words, while the Catawba have been seen as weak and dependent, the
 Lumbee are often perceived as strong contenders. Their large population size,
 relative to other tribes, also makes it more difficult for the Lumbees to gain
 the sympathy of non-Indians and western tribes who believe that the
 Lumbees' needs are not as legitimate as those of other tribes because they have
 not suffered the historical humiliations of tribes like the Catawbas.
 Economic Resources:
 The Catawbas are a small and relatively poor tribe. In 1980 there were
 only 953 enrolled members. The tribe had no other resources than its 640 acre
 reservation. Yet it had an unresolved land claim stemming from the Augusta
 Treaty in 1763. Ultimately, it was that claim that provided the leverage to
 obtain federal recognition, as well as a substantial cash settlement.
 The Lumbee, by contrast, are the largest non-federally recognized
 tribe, and they are in the top five among all tribes in population.93 The
 elements of large population and the estimated costs of serving the tribe's
 membership have been used as evidence by the BIA on many occasions to
 oppose the Lumbees' legislative attempts at recognition. In 1890, Indian
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 commissioner Thomas J. Morgan responded to the Lumbee request with the
 following statement:
 While I regret exceedingly that the provisions made by
 the State of North Carolina are entirely inadequate, I find it quite
 impractical to render any assistance at this time.... So long as
 the immediate wards of the government (some 36,000 Indian
 children) are so insufficiently provided for, I do not see how I
 can consistently render any assistance to the Croatans or any
 other civilized tribes.94
 Testifying in 1988, Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs Ross Swimmer
 (Cherokee), said a major reason for the administration's opposition to
 Lumbee recognition was "the sheer [financial] impact, which is estimated to
 be $30 to $100 million per year."" BIA officials have been quoted as saying
 that if it had not been for the size of the tribe, the Lumbees would have been
 recognized long ago.96
 On the first three factors our original hypotheses hold. It is only on
 the last factor the hypothesis was contradicted. It was the very size and wealth
 of the Lumbee tribe that in the end helped defeat its demand for recognition.
 The findings have import for interest group theory and the newly emerging
 work in identity politics, in that the factors surrounding how tribes are
 socially constructed have in this area of public policy at least as much and
 perhaps more significance than traditional measures of power such as size,
 wealth, and economic resources.
 CONCLUSION:
 This preliminary research97 and the social construction theory
 applied within it is intuitively understandable to indigenous nations, their
 citizens, and their political representatives. Tribal groups have known for the
 better part of nearly two centuries that Americans, particularly Anglo-
 Americans, harbor well-defined, if inherently contradictory ideas about who
 is an "Indian," and what constitutes a "tribe." In fact, indigenous groups have
 sometimes been able to manipulate the competing social constructions to
 gain tangible benefits (i.e., the Hopi in their long-standing battle with the
 Navajo Nation over disputed territory in Northern Arizona, effectively
 parlayed the image many Anglos have of them as a small, surrounded, and
 still largely "traditional" people in the grips of the Navajo, a numerically
 superior and somewhat less "traditional" people, to wrest substantial congres-
 sional victories vis-a-vis the Navajo Nation.)
 Thus, the core political question of"Who gets what, when, and how?"
 is a reciprocal process in which tribes are far from passive recipients of power-
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 driven policymakers. Of course, federal lawmakers control not only the purse
 strings, but the recognition string as well. Therefore, their decisions have
 greater weight in terms of the benefits to be dispensed or withheld. Moreover,
 federal policymakers are not above manipulating their constructs of Indian
 tribes though the motivations and goals vary from person to person and
 agency to agency. And while tribes today are in a better position to respond
 practically and quickly to such image orchestrations, they remain tenuously
 situated and are overly dependent on the good will ofWashington lawmakers
 to make sound policy decisions since they lack lobbying clout.
 By adding the concept of social construction to interest group theory
 we have been able to more completely analyze the factors associated with
 federal recognition. We are not suggesting that interest group theory is
 unimportant. On the contrary, the ability of the Catawba Tribe to use
 economic resources in the form ofa land claim to apply pressure to the system
 was the catalyst that eventually led to their success in Congress. The sheer size
 of the Lumbee Tribe, and the implications of that size for the federal budget,
 has been a critical factor in the denial of their petition. Nevertheless the social
 construction of each tribe presents the image and framework within which
 those factors are addressed and at least in these cases is the more powerful
 determinant. The social construction of the Catawbas as a historic Indian
 tribe with an outstanding claim against South Carolina lent legitimacy to
 their petition. On the other hand, the petitions of the Lumbees, despite more
 resources, have been denied because the social construction of the tribe has
 not as yet been seen by either the federal government, or for that matter
 enough other recognized Indian tribes, as legitimate.
 Social constructions of tribes-particularly of so-called non-recog-
 nized tribal groups-which are overtly prejudicial, based on archaic under-
 standings, or simply steeped in wrong-headed and pseudo-scientific language,
 must be counteracted with balanced, historically based, accurate information
 so that intertribal and intergovernmental decisions as important as the
 extension of diplomatic relations are made ini full view of the facts and not
 in the shadows of lingering stereotypes.
 NOTES
 1. See, e.g. Grant Foreman, Indian Removal: The Emigration of the Five Civilized Tribes of
 Indians (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press).
 2. See, e.g., Helen Hunt Jackson, A Century ofDishonor, reprint ed. (Norman, OK:
 University of Oklahoma Press, 1995, originally published in 1881); and K. Tsianina Lomawaima, They
 Called it Prairie Light: The Story of Chilocco Indian School (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press,
 1994).
 3. See, e.g., Donald Fixico, Termination and Relocation: Federal Indian Policy, 1945-1960
 (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1986).
 4. See, e.g., J. Anthony Paredes, ed. Indians of the Southeastern United States in the Late
 Twentieth Century (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1992).
 5. Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram, "Social Construction of Target Populations:
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 7. Ibid., p. 338.
 8. See William Quinn, Jr., "Federal Acknowledgment of American Indian Tribes? The
 Historical Development of a Legal Concept," The American Journal ofLegal History 34 (October
 1990):331-363.
 9. 56 Federal Register 47, 325 (1991).
 10. See David E. Wilkins, "The U.S. Supreme Court's Explication of 'Federal Plenary
 Power:' An Analysis of Case Law Affecting Tribal Sovereignty, 1886-1914," American Indian Quarterly,
 vol. 18, no. 3 (Summer 1994): 349-368.
 11. The Indian Civil Rights Act (1968), which incorporates most of the protections of the
 Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, was passed by Congress to protect tribal members
 from tribal government, but does nothing to protect tribal governments from the federal government.
 The fears of the Founding Fathers against an all-powerful, centralized government have been realized
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 Process," Human Organization, vol. 44, no. 4 (1985): 361-367.
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 125-126.
 15. Federal Register Vol. 59 (February 25, 1994), p. 9295.
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 tion Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. 479 (1976, 43 Fed. Reg. 2393 (1978), 25 C.F.R. 51 (1982). Indian Country,
 according to 18 U.S.C.A. 1151 (1948), is (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under
 the jurisdiction of the United States government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and,
 including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within
 the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory
 thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian
 titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
 17. Felix Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 1972 reprint (Albuquerque, NM: Univ.
 of New Mexico Press), p. 2.
 18. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
 19. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (New York: Schocken Books, 1971); Roger
 V. Cobb and Charles D. Elder, Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics ofAgenda Building
 (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972).
 20. C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (London: Oxford University Press, 1956).
 21. G. William Domhoff, The Higher Circles: The Governing Class in America (New York:
 Vintage Books, 1971); Thomas R. Dye, Who's Running America: The Bush Era, 5th ed. (Englewood
 Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1990); E.E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of
 Democracy in America (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960).
 22. James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations (New York: Basic Books, 1973).
 23. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge
 University Press, 1988).
 24. Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., The White Man's Indian: Images of theAmerican Indian from
 Columbus to the Present, (New York: Vintage Books, 1978).
 25. Brian W. Dippie, The Vanishing American: White Attitudes &. US. Indian Polity, (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1982).
 26. Berkhofer, p. 5.
 27. In Cecil Jane translation revised by L. A. Vineras, The Journal of Christopher Columbus
 (London: Hakluyt Society, 1960), pp. 194-200, as quoted in Berkhofer, p. 6.
 28. Jean Jacques Rousseau, Emile, or Concerning Education (Boston: D.C. Heath, 1983);
 Francois-Rene Chateaubriand, Atala; Rene; Les Adventures du denier Abercerage (Paris: Gallimass, 1971).
 29. See Alexis de Tocqueville, "The Three Races in the United States," Democracy in America
 Vol. I (New York: Vintage Books, 1945), pp. 343-452. de Tocqueville, like his contemporaries, believed
 that the Indian (culturally and physically) was doomed to death by civilization.
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 fact which those who subscribe to the myth of the "Vanishing American" conveniently overlook.
 Marlita A. Reddy (ed.), Statistical Record of Native North Americans, (Detroit, Mich.: Gale Research, Inc.,
 1993), pp. 9, 232.
 32. Berkhofer, p. 28.
 33. 24 St. 388.
 34. Janet A. McDonnell, The Dispossession of the American Indian, 1887-1934 (Bloomington,
 IN: Indiana University Press, 1991): 10.
 35. The following is an inexhaustive list of some of the most important specific amend-
 ments to the Allotment Act and a number of tribal specific allotment agreements: Act of February 28,
 1891 (26 St. 794); Act of August 15, 1894 (28 St. 305); Act of March 2, 1895 (28 St. 900) Act of June
 10, 1896 (29 St. 340); Act of June 7, 1897 (30 St. 85); Act of May 31, 1900 (31 St. 229); Act of March
 1, 1901 (31 St. 861); Act of June 30, 1902 (32 St. 500); Act of May 8, 1906 (34 St. 182-The Burke Act);
 Act of June 21, 1906 (34 St. 326); Act of June 28, 1906 (34 St. 855); Act of June 25, 1910 (36 St. 855);
 Act of September 21, 1922 (42 St. 995); and Act of February 21, 1931 (46 St. 1202).
 36. See, e.g., Henry Fritz, The Movement for Indian Assimilation, 1860-1890 (Philadelphia, PA:
 University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963); Francis P. Prucha, American Indian Policy in Crisis: Christian
 Reformers and the Indian, 1865-1900 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976); and Janet
 McDonnell, The Dispossession of the American Indian, 1887-1934 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
 Press, 1991).
 37. 43 St. 253.
 38. See Article I Sec. 2 and Amendment XIV Sec. 2 of the United States Constitution.
 39. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
 40. U.S. v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278 (1909); U.S. v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916).
 41. Berkhofer, p. 29.
 42. Dvora Yanow, "American Ethnogenesis, Policy Judgment, and Administrative Action,"
 Democracy and Difference, eds. Carol Greenhouse and Davydd Greenwood (Albany, NY: State University
 Press of New York, forthcoming).
 43. See. Howard Peckham and Charles Gibson, eds. Attitudes of Colonial Powers Toward the
 American Indian (Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press, 1969). While a number of tribes, in the
 Southwest and Florida, had significant contact with the Spanish, those colonial relations were less
 invasive than relations in the British colonies.
 44. See, Robert A. Trennert Jr., Alternative to Extinction: Federal Indian Policy and the
 Beginnings of the Reservation System, 1846-1851 (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1975).
 45. See, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Indian Affairs, Hearings on S. 2755 and S.
 3645, Part 2, 73rd Cong., 2nd sess., (Washington, D.C..: Government Printing Office, 1934): 266.
 46. The "blood quantum" standard, with historical (mid-13th century) roots in feudal
 English common law surrounding the inheritance of personal property, was originally known as the
 "parentelic system." It was devised by European lawyers as a means of determining heirship to a
 man's landed estate. The first congressional use of a specific blood-quantum, was a 1908 law which
 declared that the allotment of any deceased tribal member of the Five Civilized Tribes of "one-half or
 more Indian blood," would remain protected provided the Secretary of Interior did not arbitrarily lift
 trust restrictions. (35 St. 312, 315). Section 3 of this statute acknowledged that the Secretary of
 Interior's approval of tribal rolls was to be "conclusive evidence as to the quantum of Indian blood of
 any enrolled citizen or freedmen..." (Ibid., p. 313).
 Four years later, in 1912, Congress, in an effort to cut federal expenditures for Indian
 education programs, established a one-quarter blood degree limit (37 St. 518). This act excluded from
 day and industrial schools Indian children with less that one-quarter Indian blood. By 1917, when
 Commissioner of Indian Affairs Cato Sells introduced his "New Policy," degree or quantum of blood
 "betrayed a deep-seated, racially-defined perception of Indian peoples' corporal physical bodies as
 'uncivilized"' (Lomawaima, 1994: 82).
 Blood quantum criteria since this era have been one of the most utilized, if problematic,
 scales for determining tribal membership/citizenship and Indian eligibility for tribal, federal, and in
 some cases, state social services.
 47. Ch. 119,24 Stat.388; 25 U.S.C. Sect. 331.
 48. Ch. 732,68 Stat. 718, codified at 25 U.S.C. Sect. 564 et. seq.
 49. For an excellent discussion on the impact of time on policy making see: Richard E.
 Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers (New York: The
 Free Press, 1986).
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 & Sharp Publishers, 1982), pp. 16-17.
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 State, State of South Carolina, 1896, p. 234.
 58. James H. Merrell, The Indians' New World: Catawbas and Their Neighbors from European
 Contact through the Era of Removal (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), pp.
 250-255.
 59. Section four of the 1790 Act provided that "no sale of lands made by any Indians, or
 any nation or tribe of Indians within the United States, shall be valid to any person or persons, or to
 any state, whether having the right of pre-emption to such lands or not, unless the same shall be
 made and duly executed at some public treaty, held under the authority of the United States." 1 Stat.
 138. In 1793 Congress passed a stronger act which declared that "no purchase or grant of lands, or of
 any title or claim thereto, from any Indians or nation or tribe of Indians, within the bounds of the
 United States, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by a treaty or
 convention entered into pursuant to the constitution . . ." 1 Stat. 330, 8. This latter act also included
 criminal penalties for violators.
 60. Exhibit G, Catawba Indian Tribe of South Carolina Land Claims Settlement Act of 1993,
 Hearing before the Subcommittee on Native American Affairs, Committee on Natural Resources,
 House of Representatives, July 2, 1993, pp. 794-814.
 61. Ibid., p 796.
 62. "Mormon Elders Arrested in Columbia," The State (June 8, 1894) p. 6; "Mormons
 Persecuted in Fairfield," The State (July 21, 1897), p.1; "Mormons Threatened in Saluda," The State
 (November 14, 1901), p. 6; "Mormon Elder Beaten in Williamsburg," The State (March 27, 1903) p. 1.
 63. Ibid., p. 798.
 64. Don B. Miller, "Catawba Tribe v. South Carolina: A History of Perseverance," NARF
 Legal Review, Vol. 18 (Winter/Spring 1993), pp. 5-6.
 65. 67 St. B132.
 66. Reddy, Statistical Record of Native North Americans, p. 215.
 67. Judge Wilson was a retired District Court Judge from Pennsylvania. He was called out
 of retirement by the federal government when all the South Carolina judges recused themselves from
 the case.
 68. South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. 498 (1986).
 69. S.C. Code Ann 15-3-370, 15-67-210 (1976).
 70. "Catawba Tribe Approves Settlement with South Carolina," NARF Legal Review Vol 18
 (Winter/Spring 1993), p.1.
 71. Jeff Miller, "Future Arrives for Catawba Nation," The State (November 30, 1994), p. B1.
 72. H.R. 2399.
 73. A Report on Research of Lumbee Origins (Unpublished Manuscript, 1980). Authors have
 copy of this report.
 74. See Adolph Dial and David K. Eliades, The Only Land I Know, (San Francisco: Indian
 Historian Press, 1975).
 75. Jack Campisi, The Lumbee Petition (Pembroke, NC: Lumber River Legal Services, 1987).
 76. These are: Hatteras Tuscarora Tribe, Cherokees of Robeson and Adjoining Counties,
 Tuscarora Indian Tribe of Drowning Creek Reservation, Tuscarora Tribe of North Carolina, Eastern
 Carolina Tuscarora Indian Organization, and Tuscarora Nation of North Carolina.
 77. U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Hearings on S. 2672:
 Federal Recognition of the Lumbee Indian Tribe of North Carolina, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., 1988, p.
 36.
 78. Jack Campisi, The Lumbee Petition (1987), p. 30.
 79. Adolph Dial, The Lumbee (New York: Chelsea House, 1993), p. 63.
 80. U.S. Congress. House Report, No. 73-1752, p. 6.
 81. N.C. Public Laws, 1953, Chapter 874, p. 747.
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 82. See Arlinda Locklear, "Recognition," Public Policy and Native Americans in North
 Carolina: Issues for the '80s, ed. Susan M. Presti (Raleigh: North Carolina Center for Public Policy
 Research, 1981), p. 56.
 83. 70 Stat. 254.
 84. Ibid.
 85. Thomas, A Report on Research of Lumbee Origins, (1980), p. 63.
 86. Ibid.
 87. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
 88. Ibid., p. ix.
 89. Ibid., p. xii.
 90. Interview with Dr. Weynona Haire, Catawba Cultural Committee.
 91. Charles M. Hudson, The Catawba Nation (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press,
 1970), pp. 77-80.
 92. 476 U.S. 498, 513 (1986).
 93. The Lumbee are the ninth largest tribal population when separate tribes and bands of a
 tribal population are combined. Reddy, Statistical Record of Native North Americans, p. 233.
 94. U.S. Congress, House, Report #102-215, September 24, 1991, p. 2, note 1.
 95. U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Hearings on S. 2672:
 Federal Recognition of the Lumbee Indian Tribe of North Carolina, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., 1988, p.
 9.
 96. Congressional Record, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., 1991, Vol. 137, p. H6894.
 97. This study is a preliminary part of a larger book-length project in which the authors
 are now engaged. Comments, questions, and comparisons are invited from readers.
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